Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation [99, 96, 1, 56, 74, 90, 76, 92, 89, 50, 18, 16] . Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: image scoring models
(at least some) individuals help only those with good images. In the standing paradigm, each individual carries a standing that (typically) improves when they help others with good standing, but not when they help those with bad standing, and individuals with good standing help only other good-standing individuals.
Neither of these paradigms provides a robust explanation for social cooperation. In image-scoring models, there is no reason for an individual to only help partners with good images: since the partner's image does not affect one's future payoff, helping some partners and not others is optimal only if one is completely indifferent between helping and not helping. In game-theoretic terms, individuals never have strict incentives to follow image-scoring strategies, and hence such strategies can form at best a weak equilibrium. Closely related to this point, image-scoring equilibria are unstable in several environments [63, 85] . Standing models do yield strict, stable equilibria, but they fail to be informationally robust: computing an individual's standing requires knowledge of not only their own past behavior, but also their past partners' behavior, their partners' partners' behavior, and so on ad infinitum. Such infinite-order information is likely unavailable in many societies [76] .
We develop a new theoretical paradigm for modeling indirect reciprocity that supports positive social cooperation as a strict, stable equilibrium while relying only on simple, individualistic information: when two players meet, they observe each other's records and nothing else, and each individual's record depends only on their own past behavior. (Individualistic information is also called "first-order" [98, 47, 11, 79] .)
As our model of individual interaction, we use the classic prisoner's dilemma ("PD") with actions C, D ("Cooperate," "Defect") and a standard payoff normalization, with g, l > 0 and g − l < 1-see the top panel in Fig. 1 . This canonical game can capture many two-sided interactions, such as business partnerships [58] , management of public resources [44, 83] , and risk-sharing in developing societies [23] , as well as many welldocumented animal behaviors [30] . A critical feature of the PD is whether it exhibits strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability. Strategic complementarity means that the gain from playing D is greater when the opponent also plays D. In the PD payoff matrix displayed in Strategic complementarity is a common case in realistic social dilemmas: it implies that although D is selfishly optimal regardless of the partner's action (a defining feature of the PD), the social dilemma nonetheless retains some aspect of a coordination or stag-hunt game, so that playing C is less costly when one's partner also plays C.
For example, mobbing a predator is always risky (hence costly) for each individual, but it is much less risky when others also mob [104] . The opposite case of strategic substitutability arises when the gain from playing D is greater when the opponent plays C: mathematically, this occurs when g > l.
(Strategic Substitutability)
The distinction between strategic complementarity and substitutability has long been known to be of critical importance in economics [22, 41] , but its implications for the evolution of cooperation have not previously been assessed.
In our model, each player's record is an integer that tracks how many times that player has defected. Newborn players have record 0. Whenever an individual plays D, their record increases by 1. Whenever an individual plays C, their record remains constant with probability 1 − ε and increases by 1 with probability ε; thus, ε ∈ (0, 1)
measures the amount of noise in the system, which can reflect either errors in recording or errors in executing the intended action. An individual's record is considered to be "good" if the number of times the individual has been recorded as playing D is less than some pre-specified threshold K: this individualistic scoring is similar to image-scoring models. When two individuals meet, they both play C if and only if they both have good records: this conditioning on the partner's record is similar to standing models.
We call these strategies tolerant trigger strategies or GrimK, as they are a form of the well-known grim trigger strategies [37] with a "tolerance" of K recorded plays of D.
We analyze the steady-state equilibria of a system where the total population size is constant, but each individual has a geometrically distributed lifetime [79] . To ensure robustness, we insist that equilibrium behavior is strictly optimal at every record; in classical (normal-form) games, this implies that the equilibrium is evolutionarily stable [95, 103] .
We show that GrimK strategies can form a strict steady-state equilibrium if and only if the PD exhibits substantial strategic complementarity, in that the gain from playing D rather than C is significantly greater when the opponent plays D: the precise condition required in the PD payoff matrix displayed in Fig. 1 is
Most previous studies of indirect reciprocity restrict attention to the "donation game" instance of the PD [92] where g = l-see the bottom panel in Fig. 1 . Our analysis reveals this to be a knife-edge case that obscures the distinction between strategic complementarity (g < l) and substitutability (g > l). (However, the g = l case has also received significant attention: for example, the seminal article of Axelrod and Hamilton [3] took g = 1 and l = 1/2.) We show that the tolerance level K can be tuned so that GrimK strategies robustly support positive social cooperation in the presence of sufficiently strong strategic complementarity.
To see how to tune the threshold K, note that since even individuals who always try to cooperate are sometimes recorded as playing D due to noise, K must be large enough that the steady-state share of the population with good records is sufficiently high: with any fixed value of K, a population of sufficiently long-lived players would almost all have bad records. However, K also cannot be too high, as otherwise an individual with a very good record (that is, a very low number of D's) can safely play D until their record approaches the threshold. Another constraint is that an individual with record K − 1 who meets a partner with a bad record must not be tempted to deviate to C to preserve their own good record. These constraints lead to an upper bound on the maximum share of cooperators in equilibrium. As lifetimes become long and noise becomes small, this upper bound converges to 0 whenever g > l/(1 + l) and to l/(1 + l) whenever g < l/(1 + l)-see Table 1 -and we show that this share of cooperators can in fact be attained in equilibrium in the (γ, ε) → (1, 0) limit. Thus, greater strategic complementarity (higher l and lower g) not only helps support some cooperation; it also increases the maximum level of cooperation in the limit, as shown in Fig. 2 .
Survival Probability (γ)
Noise (ε) Table 1 : Upper bounds on cooperation. The entries are upper bounds on the share of cooperators possible in equilibria for various γ and ε values when g = 0.5 and l = 2.5, with a darker shade indicating a higher value as shown in the scale at right.
Level of Cooperation
As we move to the bottom right, the upper bound converges to l/(1 + l) ≈ .7143, which is the maximum share of cooperators sustainable in the limit, but away from the limit the upper bound can be different (the values in this table are all higher, but this is not the case for small γ or large ε). : Limit performance of GrimK strategies. a, In the green region (l > g/(1 − g)), GrimK strategies sustain a positive limit share of cooperators, which increases with l, as indicated by a deeper shade of green. In the orange region (g < l < g/(1 − g)), the limit share of cooperators with GrimK is 0, but other strategies may sustain positive cooperation in the limit. In the red region (l ≤ g), individualistic records preclude cooperation. b, The limit share of cooperators as a function of l when g = 1/2. At l = 1, there is a discontinuity; as l → ∞, the limit share of cooperators approaches 1.
Note that with image-scoring strategies an individual's image improves when they cooperate, in contrast to GrimK strategies where cooperation only slows the deterioration of one's image. Modifying GrimK strategies by specifying that cooperation improves an individual's image does not help support cooperation: our results for maximum cooperation under GrimK strategies also hold for this more complicated class of strategies.
GrimK strategies also satisfy desirable stability and convergence properties. These derive from a key monotonicity property of GrimK strategies: when the distribution of individual records is more favorable today, the same will be true tomorrow, because players with better records both behave more cooperatively and induce more cooperative behavior from their partners. (See Methods for a precise statement.) From this observation it can be shown that, whenever the initial distribution of records is more favorable than the best steady-state record distribution, the record distribution converges to the best steady state. Similarly, whenever the initial distribution is less favorable than the worst steady-state, convergence to the worst steady state obtains.
See Fig. 3 . These additional robustness properties are not shared by more complicated, non-monotone strategies that can sometimes support cooperation for a wider range of parameters than GrimK.
a b
Figure 3: Convergence of the share of cooperators. a depicts trajectories for the share of cooperators when γ = 0.8, ε = 0.02, and players use the Grim1 strategy; b does the same for the Grim2 strategy. a, All trajectories converge to the unique steady state; b, there are three steady states. Here "high" trajectories converge to the most cooperative steady state, while "low" trajectories converge to the least cooperative steady state. See Methods for details.
We also analyze evolutionary properties of GrimK equilibria. When g < l/(1 + l),
there is a sequence of GrimK equilibria that are "steady-state robust to mutants" and attains the maximum limit cooperation share of l/(1+l). By this we mean that, when a small fraction of players adopt some mutant GrimK strategy where K = K, there is a steady-state distribution of records where it remains strictly optimal to play according to GrimK. We also perform simulations of dynamic evolution when a population playing a GrimK equilibrium is infected by a mutant population playing GrimK for some K = K. (See Supplementary Information and Extended Data Fig. 1 .)
Although our main analysis takes the basic unit of social interaction to be the standard 2-player PD, many social interactions involve multiple players: the management of the commons and other public resources is a leading example [44, 83] . In the Supplementary Information we establish that, when strategic complementarity is sufficiently strong, robust cooperation in the multiplayer public goods game can be supported by a simple variant of GrimK strategies, wherein a player contributes to the public good if and only if all of their current partners have good records. In contrast, with strategic substitutability the unique strict equilibrium involves zero contribution.
As the n-player public good game is a generalization of the PD, this implies that individualistic records preclude cooperation in the PD with strategic substitutability, as indicated in the red region in Fig. 2a .
We have shown how individualistic records robustly support indirect reciprocity in supermodular PD and multiplayer public goods games. To place our results in context, recall that scoring models do not provide robust incentives, while standing models compute records as a recursive function of a player's partners' past actions and standing, their partners' actions and standing, and so on, and thus require more information than may typically be available. The simplicity and power of individualistic records suggests that they may be usefully adapted to specific settings where cooperation is based 
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Methods
Here we summarize the model and mathematical results; further details are provided in the Supplementary Information.
A Model of Social Cooperation with Individualistic Records
Time is discrete and doubly infinite: t ∈ {. . . , −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}. There is a population of individuals of unit mass, each with survival probability γ ∈ (0, 1), so each individual's lifespan is geometrically distributed with mean 1/(1 − γ). Every period, individuals randomly match in pairs to play the PD (Fig. 1) . Each 
. Note that we have normalized continuation payoffs by (1 − γ) to express them in per-period terms. A player's objective is to maximize their expected lifetime payoff.
A pair (s, µ) is an equilibrium if µ is a steady-state under s and, for each own record k and opponent's record k , the prescribed action s(k, k ) ∈ {C, D} maximizes the expected lifetime payoff from the current period onward, given by ( 
denotes the probability that a player with record k who takes action a acquires next-period record k . Note that this expression depends on the opponent's record only through the predicted current-period opponent action, s(k , k). In addition, the ratio (1 − γ)/γ captures the weight that players place on their current payoff relative to their continuation payoff from tomorrow on. We study limits where this ratio converges to 0, as opposed to time-average payoffs which give exactly 0 weight to any one period's payoff, because in the latter case optimization and equilibrium impose unduly weak restrictions [39] .
An equilibrium is strict if the maximizer is unique for all pairs (k, k ), i.e. the optimal action is always unique. Note that this equilibrium definition allows agents to maximize over all possible strategies, as opposed to only strategies from some pre-selected set. We focus on strict equilibria because they are robust, and they remain equilibria under "small" perturbations of the model. Note that the strategy Always Defect, i.e. s(k, k ) = D for all (k, k ), together with any steady state is always a strict equilibrium. Lemma 1 in the Supplementary Information characterizes the steady states for any GrimK strategy, as well as the γ, ε, g, l parameters for which the steady states are equilibria.
Limit Cooperation under GrimK Strategies
Under GrimK strategies, a matched pair of players cooperate if and only if both records are below a pre-specified cutoff K: that is, s(k, k ) = C if max{k, k } < K, and
We call an individual a cooperator if their record is below K and a defector otherwise. Note that each individual may be a cooperator for some periods of their life and a defector for other periods, rather than being pre-programmed to cooperate or defect for their entire life.
Given an equilibrium strategy GrimK, let µ C = K−1 k=0 µ k denote the corresponding steady-state share of cooperators. Note that, in a steady state with cooperator share µ C , mutual cooperation is played in share (µ C ) 2 of all matches. Let µ C (γ, ε) be the maximal share of cooperators in any tolerant trigger equilibrium (allowing for every possible K) when the survival probability is γ and the noise level is ε.
Theorem 1 in the Supplementary Information characterizes the performance of equilibria in GrimK strategies in the double limit where the survival probability approaches 1-so that players expect to live a long time and the "shadow of the future" looms large-and the noise level approaches 0-so that records are reliable enough to form the basis for incentives. (This long-lifespan/low-noise limit is the leading case of interest in theoretical analyses of indirect reciprocity [78, 79, 31, 52, 98] .) The theorem shows that, in the double limit (γ, ε) → (1, 0),μ C (γ, ε) converges to l/(1 + l) when g < l/(1 + l), and converges to 0 when g > l/(1 + l). The formal statement and proof of this result are contained in the Supplementary Information.
Barring knife-edge cases, tolerant trigger strategies can thus robustly support positive cooperation in the double limit (γ, ε) → (1, 0) if and only if the gain from defecting against a partner who cooperates is significantly smaller than the loss from cooperating against a partner who defects: g < l/(1 + l). Moreover, the maximum level of cooperation in this case is l/(1 + l). Here we explain the logic of this result.
We first show that g < µ C in any GrimK equilibrium. Newborn individuals have continuation payoff equal to the average payoff in the population, which is µ C 2 . Thus, since a newborn player plays C if and only if matched with a cooperator, µ C 2 =
are the expected continuation payoffs of a newborn player after playing C and D, respectively. Newborn players have the highest continuation payoff in the population, so V C 0 ≤ V 0 = µ C 2 . For a newborn player to prefer not to cheat a cooperative partner, it must be that V D 0 < V C 0 − (1 − γ)g/γ, so when µ C < 1 (as is necessarily the case with any noise),
This inequality can hold only if g < µ C .
We next show that γ(1 − ε)µ C < l/(1 + l) in any GrimK equilibrium. The contin-
. A necessary condition for an individual with record K − 1 to prefer to play D against a defector partner is
. Combining this inequality with the expression for V K−1 yields γ(1 − ε)µ C < l/(1 + l), which in the (γ, ε) → (1, 0)
limit gives µ C ≤ l/(1 + l).
We have established that tolerant trigger strategies can support positive cooperation in the (γ, ε) → (1, 0) limit only if g ≤ l/(1 + l), and that the maximum cooperation share cannot exceed l/(1 + l). The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by showing that when g < l/(1 + l), by carefully choosing the tolerance level K, GrimK can support cooperation shares arbitrarily close to any value between g and l/(1 + l) in equilibrium when the survival probability is close to 1 and the noise level is close to 0.
Convergence of GrimK Strategies
Fix an arbitrary initial record distribution µ 0 ∈ ∆(N). When all individuals use
GrimK strategies, the population share with record k at time t, µ t k , evolves according to
where µ C,t = K−1 k=0 µ t k . Fixing K, we say that distribution µ dominates (or is more favorable than) distributionμ if, for every k < K, k k=0 µk ≥ k k=0μk ; that is, if for every k < K the share of the population with record no worse than k is greater under distribution µ than under distributionμ. Under the GrimK strategy, letμ denote the steady state with the largest share of cooperators, and let µ denote the steady state with the smallest share of cooperators.
Theorem 2 in the Supplementary Information shows that, if the initial record distribution is more favorable thanμ, then the record distribution converges toμ; similarly, if the initial record distribution is less favorable that µ, then the record distribution converges to µ. Formally, if µ 0 dominatesμ, then lim t→∞ µ t =μ; similarly, if µ 0 is dominated by µ, then lim t→∞ µ t = µ.
In Fig. 3a the blue trajectory corresponds to the initial distribution where all players have record 0, the red trajectory is constant at the unique steady-state value µ C ≈ .2484, and the yellow trajectory corresponds to the initial distribution where all players have defector records. Here all the trajectories converge to the unique steady state. In Fig. 3b , the red trajectory is constant at the largest steady-state value 
Extended Data Figure
See Similarly, most laboratory and field studies of the effects of repeated interaction have also focused on the prisoner's dielmma [3, 33, 43, 25], though some papers consider variants with an additional third action [29, 86] .
Reciprocal altruism is an important force in long-term relationships among a relatively small number players, such as business partnerships or collusive agreements among firms, but there are many social settings where people manage to cooperate even though direct reciprocation is impossible. These interactions are better modelled as games with repeated random matching [88] . When the population is small compared to the discount factor, cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma can be enforced by contagion equilibria even when players have no information at all about each other's past actions [56, 31, 45] . These equilibria do not exist when the population is large compared to the discount factor, so they are ruled out by our assumption of a continuum population.
Previous research on indirect reciprocity in large populations has studied the enforcement of cooperation as an equilibrium using first-order information. Takahashi
[98] shows that cooperation can be supported as a strict equilibrium when the PD exhibits strategic complementarity; however, his model does not allow noise or the inflow of new players, and assumes players can use a commonly known calendar to coordinate their play. Heller and Mohlin [48] show that, under strategic complementarity, the presence of a small share of players who always defect allows cooperation to be sustained as a stable (though not necessarily strict) equilibrium when players are infinitely lived and infinitely patient and are restricted to using stationary strategies. The broader importance of strategic complementarity has long been recognized in economics [22, 41] [78, 79] consider all possible record systems of this type, and show that only 8 of them allow an ESS with high levels of coooperation. Our first-order records can take on any integer values, so they do not fall into this class, even though behavior is determined by a binary classification of the records. Another innovation in our model is to consider steady-state equilibria in a model with a constant inflow of new players, even without any evolutionary dynamics. This approach has previously been used to model industry dynamics in economics [51, 55] , but is novel in the context of models of cooperation and repeated games.
The key novel aspects of our framework may thus be summarized as follows:
1. Information ("records") depends only on a player's own past actions, but players condition their behavior on their own record as well as their current partner's record.
2. The presence of strategic complementarity implies that such two-sided conditioning can generate strict incentives for cooperation.
3. Records are integers, and can therefore remain "good" even if they are repeatedly hit by noise (as is inevitable when players are long-lived).
The presence of a constant inflow of new players implies that the population
share with "good" records can remain positive even in steady state.
Model Description
Here we formally present the model and the steady-state and equilibrium concepts.
Time is discrete and doubly infinite: t ∈ {. . . , −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}. There is a unit mass of individuals, each with survival probability γ ∈ (0, 1), and an inflow of 1 − γ newborns each period to keep the population size constant.
Every period, individuals randomly match in pairs to play the PD (Fig. 1) . Each A steady state under strategy s is a state µ such that f s (µ) = µ.
Given a strategy s and state µ, the expected flow payoff of a player with record k is π k (s, µ) = k µ k u(s(k, k ), s(k , k)), where u is the (normalized) PD payoff function given by
.
Denote the probability that a player with current record k has record k t periods in the future by φ k (s, µ) t (k ). The continuation payoff of a player with record k is then This equilibrium definition encompasses two forms of strategic robustness. First, we allow agents to maximize over all possible strategies, as opposed to only strategies from some pre-selected set. Second, we focus on strict equilibria, which remain equilibria under "small" perturbations of the model.
Limit Cooperation under GrimK Strategies
Under GrimK strategies, a matched pair of players cooperate if and only if both records are below a pre-specified cutoff K: that is, s(k, k ) = C if max{k, k } < K and
We call an individual a cooperator if their record is below K and a defector otherwise. Note that each individual may be a cooperator for some periods of their life and a defector for other periods.
The following theorem characterizes the performance of equilibria in GrimK strategies in the double limit of interest [78, 79, 31, 52, 98] where the survival probability approaches 1-so that players expect to live a long time and the "shadow of the future" looms large-and the noise level approaches 0-so that players who play C are unlikely to be recorded as playing D.
To prove the theorem, let β : (0, 1) × (0, 1) × (0, 1) → (0, 1) be the function given by
When players use GrimK strategies and the share of cooperators is µ C , β(γ, ε, µ C ) is the probability that a player with cooperator record k survives to reach record k + 1.
(This probability is the same for all k < K.)
There is a GrimK equilibrium with cooperator share µ C if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. Feasibility:
(2) 2. Incentives:
(4)
Note that µ C = 0 solves (2) when K = 0. For any K > 0, 0 < 1 − β(γ, ε, µ C ) K and 1 > 1 − β(γ, ε, 1) K , so by the intermediate value theorem, (2) has some solution µ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, there is at least one steady state for every GrimK strategy. For some strategies, there are multiple steady states, but never more than K + 1, because (2) can be rewritten as a polynomial equation in µ C with degree K + 1.
The upper bounds on the equilibrium share of cooperators in Table 1 are the suprema of the µ C ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy (3) and (4) for the corresponding (γ, ε) parameters. When no µ C ∈ (0, 1) satisfy (3) and (4), the upper bound is 0, since Grim0
(where everyone plays D) is always a strict equilibrium.
To see how Part 2 of Theorem 1 comes from Lemma 1, note that
Thus, (3) requires µ C > g. Moreover, combining µ C > g with (4) gives γ(1 − ε)g < l/(1 + l). Taking the (γ, ε) → (1, 0) limit of this inequality gives g ≤ l/(1 + l). Thus, when g > l/(1 + l), it follows that lim (γ,ε)→(1,0) µ C (γ, ε) = 0.
All that remains is to show that lim (γ,ε)→(1,0) µ C (γ, ε) = l/(1 + l) when g > l/(1 + l).
Since lim ε→0 (1−ε)(1−µ C )/(1−(1−ε)µ C ) = 1 for any fixed µ C and lim (γ,ε)→(1,0) 1/(γ(1− ε)) = 1, it follows that values of µ C smaller than, but arbitrarily close to, l/(1+l) satisfy
(3) and (4) in the double limit. Thus, the only difficulty is showing the feasibility of µ C as a steady-state level of cooperation: because K must be an integer, some values of µ C cannot be generated by any K, for given values of γ and ε. The following result shows that this "integer problem" becomes irrelevant in the limit. That is, any value of µ C ∈ (0, 1) can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a feasible steady-state share of cooperators for some GrimK strategy as (γ, ε) → (1, 0).
Lemma 2. Fix any µ C ∈ (0, 1). For all ∆ > 0, there exist γ < 1 and ε > 0 such that, for all γ > γ and ε < ε, there existsμ C that satisfies (2) for some K such that
Proof of Lemma 1
The feasibility condition of Lemma 1 comes from the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In a GrimK equilibrium with cooperator share µ C ,
To see why the feasibility condition of Lemma 1 comes from Lemma 3, note that
Proof of Lemma 3. The inflow into record 0 is 1 − γ, while the outflow from record 0 is (1 − γ(1 − ε)µ C )µ 0 . Setting these equal gives
Additionally, for every 0 < k < K, the inflow into record k is γ(1 − (1 − ε)µ C )µ k−1 , while the outflow from record k is (1 − γ(1 − ε)µ C )µ k . Setting these equal gives
Combining this with µ 0 = 1 − β(γ, ε, µ C ) gives µ k = β(γ, ε, µ C ) k (1 − β(γ, ε, µ C )) for
The incentive constraint (3) of Lemma 4 guarantees that a record-0 cooperator plays C against an opponent playing C, and the incentive constraint (1) guarantees that a record-(K − 1) cooperator plays D against an opponent playing D. Record-0 cooperators are the cooperators most tempted to defect against a cooperative opponent and record-(K − 1) cooperators are the cooperators most tempted to cooperate against a defecting opponent, so these constraints guarantee the incentives of all cooperators are satisfied.
Lemma 4. In a GrimK equilibrium with cooperator share µ C ,
To see why the incentive constraints of Lemma 1 come from Lemma 4, note that the expected continuation payoff of a record-0 player from playing C is (1 − ε)V 0 + εV 1 , while the expected continuation payoff from playing D is V 1 . Thus, a record 0 player strictly prefers to play C against an opponent playing C iff (1−ε)γ(V 0 −V 1 )/(1−γ) > g.
Combining Lemmas 3 and 4 gives
so (3) follows. Moreover, the expected continuation payoff of a record K −1 player from playing C is (1 − ε)V K−1 + εV K , while the expected continuation payoff from playing D is V K . Thus, a record K − 1 player strictly prefers to play D against an opponent
and setting this to be less than l gives (4).
Proof of Lemma 4. The flow payoff for any record k ≥ K is 0, so V k = 0 for k ≥ K.
Proof of Lemma 2
LetK : (0, 1) × (0, 1) × (0, 1) → R + be the function given bỹ
(5)
Let d : (0, 1] × [0, 1) × (0, 1) → R be the function given by
The µ C derivative ofK(γ, ε, µ C ) is related to d(γ, ε, µ C ) by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.K : (0, 1) × (0, 1) × (0, 1) → R + is differentiable in µ C with derivative given
Proof of Lemma 5. From (5), it follows thatK(γ, ε, µ C ) is differentiable in µ C with derivative given by
The following two lemmas concern properties of d(γ, ε, µ C ) that will be useful for the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 6. d : (0, 1] × [0, 1) × (0, 1) → R is well-defined and continuous.
Proof of Lemma 6. Since β(γ, ε, µ C ) is differentiable and only takes values in (0, 1), it follows that d(γ, ε, µ C ) is well-defined. Moreover, since β(γ, ε, µ C ) is continuously differentiable for all µ C ∈ (0, 1), d(γ, ε, µ C ) is continuous for γ < 1. All that remains is to check that d(γ, ε, µ C ) is continuous for γ = 1.
First, note that d(1, ε, µ C ) is continuous in (ε, µ C ). Thus, we need only check the limit in which γ approaches 1, but never equals 1. Note that
It is clear that
for all (ε, µ C ) ∈ [0, 1) × (0, 1). For γ close to 1,
Thus,
for all (ε, µ C ) ∈ [0, 1) × (0, 1). Equations 6, 7, and 8 together imply that d(γ, ε, µ C ) is continuous for γ = 1.
Lemma 7. d(1, 0, µ C ) has precisely one zero in µ C ∈ (0, 1), and the zero is located at
Proof of Lemma 7. This follows from the fact that d(1, 0, µ C ) = 1 + ln(1 − µ C ).
With these preliminaries established, we now present the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix someμ C ∈ (0, 1) such thatμ C = 1 − 1/e. Lemma 7 says d(1, 0,μ C ) = 0. Because of this and the continuity of d, there exist some λ > 0 and some δ > 0, γ < 1, and ε > 0 such that |d(γ, ε, µ C )| > λ for all γ > γ , ε < ε, and
Additionally, note that lim γ→1 inf (ε,µ C )∈(0,ε)×(µ C −δ,µ C +δ) β(γ, ε, µ C ) = 1. Together these facts imply that there exists some γ < 1 such that
for all γ > γ, ε < ε. Hence, there exists someμ C within ∆ ofμ C and some nonnegative integerK such thatK(γ, ε,μ C ) =K, which implies thatμ C is feasible sincê
Convergence of GrimK Strategies
We now derive a key stability property of GrimK strategies. Fix an arbitrary initial record distribution µ 0 ∈ ∆(N). When all individuals use GrimK strategies, the population share with record k at time t, µ t k , evolves according to
where µ C,t = K−1 k=0 µ t k .
Fixing K, we say that distribution µ dominates (or is more favorable than) distributionμ if, for every k < K, k k=0 µk ≥ k k=0μk ; that is, if for every k < K the share of the population with record no worse than k is greater under distribution µ than under distributionμ. Under the GrimK strategy, letμ denote the steady state with the largest share of cooperators, and let µ denote the steady state with the smallest share of cooperators.
Theorem 2.
1. If µ 0 dominatesμ, then lim t→∞ µ t =μ.
2. If µ 0 is dominated by µ, then lim t→∞ µ t = µ.
Let x k = k k=0 µk denote the share of the population with record no worse than k. From Equation 9, it follows that
To see this, note that x 0 = µ 0 and x K−1 = µ C , so rewriting the first line in Equation   9 gives the first line in Equation 10. Additionally, for 0 < k < K, Equation 9 gives
Lemma 8. The update map in Equation 10 is weakly increasing:
Proof of Lemma 8. The right-hand side of the first line in Equation 10 depends only on the product of x t 0 and x t K−1 , and it is strictly increasing in this product. The right-hand side of the second line in Equation 10 depends only on x t k−1 , x t k , and x t K−1 , and, holding fixed any two of these variables, it is weakly increasing in the third variable.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove the first statement of Theorem 2. A similar argument handles the second statement. Let (x t 0 , ...,x t K−1 ) denote the time-path corresponding to the highest possible initial conditions, i.e. (x 0 0 , ...,x 0 K−1 ) = (1, ..., 1). By Lemma 8, (x t+1 0 , ...,x t+1 K−1 ) ≤ (x t 0 , ...,x t K−1 ) for all t. Thus, it follows that lim t→∞ (x t 0 , ...,x t K−1 ) = inf t (x t 0 , ...,x t K−1 ), so in particular lim t→∞ (x t 0 , ...,x t K−1 ) exists. Since the update rules in Equation 10 are continuous, it follows that lim t→∞ (x t 0 , ...,x t K−1 ) must be a steady state of the system. By Lemma 8 and the fact that (x 0 , ..., x K−1 ) is the steady state with the highest share of cooperators, it follows that lim t→∞ (x t 0 , ...,x t K−1 ) = (x 0 , ..., x K−1 ). Now, fix some (x 0 0 , ..., x 0 K−1 ) ≥ (x 0 , ..., x K−1 ). By Lemma 8,
for all t, so it follows that lim t→∞ (x t 0 , ..., x t K−1 ) = (x 0 , ..., x K−1 ).
Evolutionary Analysis
We have so far analyzed the efficiency of GrimK equilibrium steady states (Theorem 1) and convergence to such steady states when all players use the GrimK strategy (Theorem 2). To further examine the robustness of GrimK strategies, we now perform two types of evolutionary analysis. In Section 5.1, we show that, when g < l/(1 + l), there are sequences of GrimK equilibria that obtain the maximum cooperator share of l/(1 + l) as (γ, ε) → (1, 0) that are robust to invasion by a small mass of mutants who follow any other GrimK strategy, such as Always Defect (i.e., Grim0). In Section 5.2, we report simulations of the evolutionary dynamic when a GrimK steady state is invaded by mutants playing another GrimK strategy.
Steady-State Robustness
We consider the following notion of steady-state robustness.
Definition 1.
A GrimK equilibrium with share of cooperators µ C is steady-state robust to mutants if, for every K = K and α > 0, there exists some δ > 0 such that when the share of players playing GrimK is 1 − δ and the share of players playing
GrimK is δ with δ < δ, then
• There is a steady state where the fraction of players playing GrimK that are cooperators,μ C , satisfies |μ C − µ C | < α, and
• It is strictly optimal to play GrimK.
We show that, whenever strategic complementarities are strong enough to support a cooperative GrimK equilibrium, there is a sequence of GrimK equilibria that are robust to mutants and attains the maximum cooperation level of l/(1+l) when expected lifespans are long and noise is small.
Theorem 3. Suppose that g < l/(1 + l). There is a family of GrimK equilibria giving a share of cooperators µ C (γ, ε) for parameters γ, ε such that:
1. lim (γ,ε)→(1,0) µ C (γ, ε) = l/(1 + l), and 2. There is some γ < 1 and ε > 0 such that, when γ > γ and ε < ε, the GrimK equilibrium with share of cooperators µ C (γ, ε) is steady-state robust to mutants.
Proof. We assume that K < K; the proof for K > K is analogous. Fix some g <μ C < l/(1 + l) satisfyingμ C = 1 − 1/e. By Lemmas 1 and 2, we know that there exists some family of tolerant trigger strategy equilibria with share of cooperatorsμ C (γ, ε) such that lim (γ,ε)→(1,0)μ C (γ, ε) =μ C . Fix some γ, ε, and consider the modified environment where share 1 − δ of the players use the GrimK strategy corresponding toμ C (γ, ε) and
share δ of the players use some other GrimK .
Let µ K K denote the share of the players playing GrimK that have record less than K, let µ K K be the share of GrimK players with record less than K , and let µ K K be the share of the players playing GrimK that have record less than K . Then in an steady state we have Becauseμ C (γ, ε) = 1−β(γ, ε, µ C (γ, ε)) K and K = ln(1−μ C (γ, ε))/ ln(β(γ, ε,μ C (γ, ε))),
Recall that
Thus, lim (γ,ε)→(1,0) β(γ, ε,μ C (γ, ε)) = 1. Hence, it follows that for high γ and small ε,
Combining these results gives us lim (γ,ε)→(1,0) ∂β ∂µ C (γ, ε,μ C (γ, ε)) β(γ, ε,μ C (γ, ε)) ln(β(γ, ε,μ C (γ, ε)))
Sinceμ = 1−1/e, we have 1+ln(1−μ) = 0. Thus, using (13), we conclude that the determinant of the matrix of partial derivatives in (12) is non-zero, and so can appeal to the implicit function theorem to conclude that for sufficiently high γ and small ε, for each K = K and α > 0, there is some δ 1 > 0 such that when the share of players playing GrimK is 1 − δ and the share of players playing GrimK is δ with δ < δ 1 , there is a steady state where the fraction of players using GrimK that are cooperators, µ C , is such that |µ C −μ C (γ, ε)| < α. Additionally, because the GrimK equilibrium with share of cooperatorsμ C (γ, ε) is a strict equilibrium where players have uniformly strict incentives to play according to GrimK at every own record and partner record, it follows that there is some 0 < δ < δ 1 such that, when the share of players playing
GrimK is 1 − δ and the share of players playing GrimK is δ with δ < δ, there is a steady state with share of cooperators µ C such that |µ C −μ C (γ, ε)| < α where it is strictly optimal to play GrimK.
Dynamics
We performed a simulation to capture dynamic evolution. We considered a population initially playing the Grim5 equilibrium with steady-state share of cooperators of µ C ≈ 0.8998 when γ = 0.9, ε = 0.1, g = 0.4, l = 2.8 that is infected with a mutant population playing Grim1 at t = 0. The initial share of the population that played Grim5 was .95, and the complementary share of 0.05 played Grim1. At t = 0, all of the Grim1 mutants had record 0, while the record shares of the Grim5 population were proportional to those in the original steady state. At period t, the players match, observe each others' records (but not what population their opponent belongs to), and then play as their strategy dictates. We denote the average payoff of the Grim5 players and Grim1 players at period t by π Grim5,t and π Grim1,t , respectively.
The evolution of the system from period t − 1 to t was driven by the average payoffs and sizes of the two populations at t − 1. In particular, at any period t > 0, the share of the newborn players that belonged to the Grim5 population (µ N Grim5,t ) was
proportional to the product of µ Grim5,t−1 and π Grim5,t−1 , and similarly the share of the 1 − γ newborn players that belonged to the Grim1 population (µ N Grim1,t ) was
proportional to the product of µ Grim1,t−1 and π Grim1,t−1 . Formally, Fig. 1 presents the results of this simulation. Extended Data Fig. 1a depicts the evolution of the share of players that use Grim5 and are cooperators (i.e. have record k < 5). Initially, this share is below the steady-state value of ≈ 0.8998, and is decreasing as the Grim1 mutants obtain high payoffs relative to the normal Grim5 players on average. However, the share of cooperator Grim5 players eventually begins to increase and approaches its steady-state value as the mutants die out.
Extended Data
The reason the mutants eventually die out is that their payoffs eventually decline, as depicted in Extended Data Fig. 1b . The tendency of the Grim1 players to defect means that they tend to move to high records relatively quickly, and so while they initially receive a high payoff from defecting against cooperators, this advantage is short lived.
We found similar results when the mutant population plays Grim9 rather than Grim1, although the average payoff in the mutant population never exceeded that in the normal population. And we again found similar results when a population initially playing the Grim8 equilibrium with steady-state share of cooperators of µ C ≈ 0.613315 and γ = 0.95, ε = 0.05, g = 0.5, l = 4 is infected with a mutant population playing Grim3 at t = 0, and for when it is infected with a mutant population playing Grim13.
Public Goods
Our analysis so far has taken the basic unit of social interaction to be the standard 2-player prisoner's dilemma. However, there are important social interactions that involve many players: the management of the commons and other public resources is a leading example [44, 26, 10, 83] . Such multiplayer public goods games have been the subject of extensive theoretical and experimental research [68, 91, 62, 34, 82, 9] .
Here we show that a simple variant of GrimK strategies can support positive robust cooperation in the multiplayer public goods game when there is sufficient strategic complementarity.
We use the same model as considered so far, except that now in each period the players randomly match in groups of size n, for some fixed integer n ≥ 2. All players in each group simultaneously decide whether to Contribute (C) or Not Contribute (D).
If exactly x of the n players in the group contribute, each group member receives a benefit of f (x) ≥ 0, where f : N → R + is a strictly increasing function with f (0) = 0.
In addition, each player who contributes incurs a private cost of c > 0. This coincides with the 2-player PD when n = 2, f (1) = 1 + g, f (2) = l + 2 + g, and c = l + 1 + g.
For each x ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}, let ∆(x) = f (x+1)−f (x) denote the marginal benefit to each member when there is an additional contribution. Assume that ∆(x) < c < n∆(x)
for each x ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. This assumption makes the public good game an n-player PD, in that D is the selfishly optimal action while everyone playing C is socially optimal.
We consider the same record system as in the 2-player PD: Newborns have record 0. If a player plays D, their record increases by 1. If a player plays C, their record increases by 1 with probability ε > 0, and remains constant with probability 1 − ε.
As in the 2-player PD, we find that a key determinant of the prospects for robust cooperation is the degree of strategic complementarity or substitutability in the social dilemma. In the public good game, we say that the interaction exhibits strategic complementarity if ∆(x) is increasing in x (i.e., contributing is more valuable when more partners contribute), and exhibits strategic substitutability if ∆(x) is decreasing in x.
We first show that with strategic substitutability the unique strict equilibrium is Never Contribute. This generalizes our finding that Always Defect is the unique strict equilibrium in the 2-player PD when g ≥ l.
Theorem 4. For any n ≥ 2, if the public good game exhibits strategic substitutability, the unique strict equilibrium is Never Contribute.
Proof. Suppose n players who all have the same record k meet. By symmetry, either they all contribute or none of them contribute. In the former case, contributing is optimal for a record-k player when all partners contribute, so by strategic substitutability contributing is also optimal for a record-k player when a smaller number of partners contribute. Thus, a record-k player contributes regardless of their partners' records. In the latter case, not contributing is optimal for a record-k player when no partners contribute, so by strategic substitutability not contributing is also optimal for a record-k player when a larger number of partners contribute.
We have established that, for each k, record-k players do not condition their behavior on their opponents' records. Hence, the distribution of future opposing actions faced by any player is independent of their record. This implies that not contributing is always optimal.
We now turn to the case of strategic complementarity and consider the following simple generalization of GrimK strategies: Records k < K are considered to be "good," while records k ≥ K are considered "bad." When n players meet, they all contribute if all of their records are good; otherwise, none of them contribute.
For GrimK strategies to form an equilibrium, two incentive constraints must be satisfied: First, a player with record 0 (the "safest" good record) must want to contribute in a group with n − 1 other good-record players. Second, a player with record K − 1 (the "most fragile" good record) must not want to contribute in a group where no one else contributes.
We let g = c − ∆(n − 1) and l = c − ∆(0). Note that
